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1 Introduction 26 The question of equity plays a major role in current climate negotiations, involving ethical 27 considerations and a broader analysis than the utilitarian approach to analyze the costs of 28 climate change mitigation (Gardiner, 2004) . From this perspective, addressing inequality in 29 per-capita emissions across countries is central for a fair allocation of emission rights, and 30 hence the responsibility to reduce emissions, in any future climate agreement. Currently, 31 global emissions are very unequally distributed between countries, with about 1 billion 32 people living in industrialized countries being responsible for roughly half of the global CO 2 33 emissions (WEO, 2010). However, recent growth spurts have caused a sharp increase in 34 developing countries' emissions, closing part of the gap to richer countries, such that for the 35 period 2001-2008 the growth of global emission can almost exclusively be attributed to 36 developing countries (Steckel et al., 2011) . 37
Previous literature has highlighted that in the process of economic development countries 38 undergo characteristic transformations of their energy systems. For instance, while countries 39 at early stages of industrialization predominantly rely on solid fuels, a large part of these 40 fuels is replaced by grid-based, high-quality forms of energy -such as natural gas and 41 electricity -with proceeding industrialization (Grubler, 2008; Marcotullio and Schulz, 2007) . 42
Further, rising per capita income has been found to result in a smaller share of final energy 43 use for the residential sector but larger ones for transportation and the service sector and a 44 reversed U-shape pattern for industry (Schäfer, 2005) . As convergence in per-capita 45 incomes is closely related to convergence in energy use patterns (Jakob et al., 2012) , one 46 should expect the spectacular growth performances witnessed in a number of developing 47 countries to have major impacts on the distribution of CO 2 emissions per-capita across 48 countries. 49
Given the pivotal role of emissions inequality for climate negotiations, the issue has been 50 investigated in the literature through a variety of methods. (Hedenus and Azar, 2005) use 51 the Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970) to find a declining trend in global emission inequality 52 between 1960 and 1999 (from 0.64 to 0.5). This is based on their finding that in 1999 the 53 20% most emitting countries emitted about 22 times the amount of carbon than the 20% 54 least emitting countries, while in 1960 this gap had been more than twice as large. Various 55 authors use the Theil Index (Theil, 1972) to measure and explain global emission inequality 56 (e.g. Padilla and Duro, 2011) . The advantage of the Theil index is that it can be decomposed 57 in inequality within and between country groupings (Shorrocks, 1982) . Duro and Padilla, 58 (2006) use the Kaya identity (1989) to decompose emission inequality across countries into 59 the contributions of carbon intensity of energy, energy intensity and affluence. They find that 60 during the period from 1970 to 1999 income differences were the main drivers of emission 61 inequality between countries, while differences in carbon intensity and energy intensity 62 displayed lower contributions 1 . Padilla and Serrano (2006) also show, using the Gini and the 63 Theil index for country-level emissions, that emission inequality is closely correlated with 64 income inequality and that both follow the same path over time. Finally, Duro, (2012) 65 compares a set of inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient, Theil index, the Atkinson 66 measure as well as the coefficient of variation in terms of their sensitivity to changes in the 67 distribution of CO 2 emissions over time. He concludes that different inequality indicators can 68 yield differing results due to differences in their distributive sensitivity. 69 A further widely employed measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient. In the case of CO 2 70 emissions, the cumulative share of global CO 2 emissions is plotted against the cumulative 71 share of the countries from the lowest to the highest per capita emissions. Wodon, 72 (2000, 1997) follow the methodology of Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) to decompose the Gini 73 coefficient in a within group and a between group component. The between group 74 component compares rich and poor countries in order to analyze the contribution to the 75 global emission inequality. They find that between group inequality declined slightly, but rich 76 countries would have to reduce emissions by at least 50% to change the ranking of the 77 highest polluting countries. 78
This paper adds to the existing literature by investigating how the energy mix and the 79 sectoral composition of a country's energy use determine inequality in global CO 2 emissions. 80
Employing the decomposition of the Gini index pioneered by Lerman & Yitzhaki (1985) , 81 economy-wide emissions are disaggregated into contributions by primary energy carriers 82 and economic sectors to estimate the contribution of each source of emission (i.e. each 83 primary energy carrier, or economic sector, respectively) to total inequality. While this 84 empirical methodology is well established in the analysis of income inequality between 85 households (Leibbrandt et al., 2000) , this is -to our knowledge -the first paper to employ it 86 to analyze inequality in carbon emissions across countries. 87
We analyze both past trends using historical data on energy-related CO 2 emissions for 90 88 countries (which currently account for about 90% of global CO 2 emissions) over the period 89 1971-2008 and, in order to provide an outlook on how climate policy could affect future 90 emission inequality, we also apply the decomposition method on emission scenarios 91 generated with the integrated assessment model REMIND (Kriegler et al., submitted) ; 92 (Bauer et al., 2012) . 93
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the employed empirical method, and 94 Section 3 the used data. Section 4 applies the methodology using both historical data, for a 95 global sample as well as for a sub-sample of OECD and non-OECD countries, and results of 96 the REMIND model. Section 5 presents the outcomes of a sensitivity analysis, while section 97 6 concludes. 98
Methodology

99
This study adopts the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality for two main reasons. 100
Firstly, it is arguably the most popular and widely employed inequality measure; for instance, 101 it is adopted by the UNDP in its annual Human Development Reports (UNDP, 2010). 102
Secondly, it allows for a straightforward decomposition of total CO 2 emission inequality into 103 contributions of individual sources and an estimation of the marginal effect of a change in 104 any of these sources on overall emission inequality. 105
The Gini index builds on the concept of Lorenz Curves, which plot the cumulative share of 106 income earned against the cumulative share of the units from the lowest to the highest 107 income (Gini, 1912; Lorenz, 1905) . It can range between 0 and 1, where 0 represents total 108 equality and 1 represents total inequality. The Gini Index for CO 2 emissions has the 109 geometric interpretation as one minus twice the area below the Lorenz Curve for emission 110 distribution across countries and the diagonal line, which represents perfect emission 111 equality. 112
We apply the decomposition of the Gini index after Yitzhaki (1985, 1984) to 113 analyze the effects of each source of carbon emissions (i.e. primary energy carrier and 114 economic sector) on inequality in per-capita CO 2 emissions across countries. Lerman and 115 Yitzhaki (1985 Yitzhaki ( , 1984 demonstrate that the Gini coefficient of total emissions can be 116 expressed as a function of (i) the inequality within a given source, (ii) the share of this source 117 in total emissions, and (iii) its rank correlation with total emission inequality. With this Gini 118 decomposition we are able to determine the contribution of each emission source to the Gini 119 index of total per-capita emissions (G) between countries: 120
Here k is the index denoting the source of emissions (primary energy carrier, or economic 122 sector, respectively), G k is the Gini of component k, S k is the share of component k in total 6 emissions and R k is the rank correlation between emission component k and total 124 emissions 2 . Consequently, the contribution of each single source k to overall inequality in 125 per-capita emissions is given by ! ! ! . 126
In addition, this methodology allows analyzing the effect of marginal changes in any single 127 source of emissions, which is useful to assess the impact on inequality in carbon emission 128 across countries that are brought about by policies and/or technological advances that equal 129 percentage reduction of emissions from any one source (see section 4.3). This marginal 130 effect of a change e in any source k for overall inequality G can then be written as: 131
The decomposition method presented above can be applied for any given time period. As 133 we are interested in the evolution of inequality over time, Section 4.1 presents the 134 decomposition of the overall inequality into the contribution of each source of emissions k 135 (i.e. primary energy carrier, or economic sector, respectively) for 5-year intervals for the 136 period 1971 to 2008. 137 In order to gain a deeper understanding of the factors driving the evolution of overall 138 inequality, we employ the Laspeyres decomposition method (e.g. Sun and Ang, (2000) see 139 section 4.2). The Laspeyres decomposition allows us to break down changes in overall 140 emission inequality to changes in its single components G, S, and R. With Δ denoting the 141 difference between the year 2008 and 1971, we can decompose the change in the Gini 142 index of total per-capita emissions between two points in time into the joint contribution of 143 three underlying effects E for every source of emissions: 144
This can be expressed as: 146
The individual effects can be derived from carrying out the multiplication in (3) and dividing 148 the residuals (i.e. changes of second and third order) evenly across factors. This is 149 demonstrated exemplarily for ! ! , i.e. the change in inequality that can be attributed to a 150 change of the share of source k in total per-capita emissions, below: 151 The IEA dataset contains data on CO 2 -emissions disaggregated by primary energy carriers 159 ('coal/peat', 'oil', 'gas' and 'other') as well as economic sectors ('manufacturing & 160 construction', 'transport', 'residential', 'other sectors', and 'agriculture'). We exclude 161 emissions specified as coming from 'other' sources, as this source mainly includes 162 emissions from the combustion of biomass and waste, and there is currently a lively debate 163 3 Our analysis focuses on energy-related CO 2 -emissions; land-use emissions as well as non-CO 2 greenhouse gas emissions (such as CH 4 and N 2 O) are not part of the analysis. on how these emissions should be accounted 6 . From the sectoral perspective, the data is 164 organized in a way that it attributes emissions produced in transformation sectors (such as 165 electricity generation, or refining) to final use sectors (e.g. transport or residential) according 166 to the latter sector's consumption of energy from each transformation sector. With the 167 aggregate 'other sectors' being the sum of emissions from the residential and the service 168 sector, we are able to derive 'service sector emissions' by subtracting residential emissions 169 from 'other sectors'. Within the IEA dataset we exclude emissions from the agricultural 170 sector due to a lack of available data. As agricultural emissions account for only a small 171 fraction of energy-related emissions 7 for the large majority of countries, we do not expect this 172 exclusion to seriously bias our results. 173
In our sample, we only include countries for which there is full information (i.e. no values 174 marked as 'missing') for CO 2 emissions on the level of primary energy carriers as well as 175 economic sectors. We further exclude all countries for which CO 2 emissions from any 176 primary energy carrier or economic sector have zero entries over the entire observation 177 period, as we expect that this might indicate erroneous accounting. We do, however, include 178 countries that display zero observations for some years 8 . For years prior to 1990, we use 179 emission data for the Former Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia, respectively, while from 180 1990 onwards, we separately include each constituent state in our sample 9 . This leaves us 181 with a sample of 90 countries (see Table A3 ), which accounted for approximately 90% of 182 global CO 2 emissions in the year 2008. 183
The REMIND data contain information on emissions per primary energy carrier for a 184 business as usual (BAU) and a climate policy scenario (POL). REMIND is a multi-regional 185 global integrated assessment hybrid model which couples a Ramsey-type optimal growth 186 model with a technology-rich detailed energy system model and a simple climate model. It 187 represents 11 world regions (see Figure A1 ) and considers the time horizon of 2005-2100 10 . 188
In order to match the regional aggregation of the model to our data, we generate scenarios 189 of future emissions on the country level by means of extrapolation. That is, we apply the 
Marginal Effects of Changing Emission Patterns
301
This section discusses the results of the application of the methodology to determine the 302 marginal effect of an equally spread percentage reduction from any single source of 303 emissions (i.e. primary energy carrier or economic sector) on the Gini index of total per-304 capita emissions. This kind of analysis could bear importance for the formulation of climate 305 policies, as it allows assessing the impacts of e.g. technological innovations that reduce 306 emissions from one given energy carrier or economic sector (such as more efficient power 307 plants or automobiles), or a global agreement calling for equal percentage reduction of 308 emissions from any particular sector (such as the manufacturing &construction sector). 309
The results of this exercise (undertaken for 2008 data) are shown in Table 1 . The most 310 striking feature is that, regardless of their sign, these marginal effects are relatively small. 311
For instance, an across the board reduction of emissions from coal/peat by 1% would 312 decrease the Gini index of total per-capita CO 2 emissions across countries by no more than 313 0.07%. For the remaining energy carriers and economic sectors, the respective effects are 314 even less pronounced. Hence, we conclude that an equally spread percentage reduction 315 from any one source of CO 2 emissions would not significantly alter the prevailing pattern of 316 global inequality in per-capita emissions. 317 318 Insert 
Emission Inequality for Different Country Groupings
325
While the focus of this paper is clearly on global inequality, we repeat the above procedure 326 for OECD as well as non-OECD countries, respectively. This allows us to assess whether 327 the trends identified above can also be detected for these individual country groupings. 328
Compared to the full sample, we find a significantly lower Gini index of overall emissions for 329 OECD countries ( Figure A2 ). In 1971 it lies slightly below 0.4, declining to about 0.25 in 330
2008. Hence, OECD countries start more homogenously and seem to converge faster to 331 more equal per capita CO 2 emission than non-OECD countries, which start with an initial 332 Gini of 0.6 and a Gini of 0.45 in 2008 ( Figure A3 ). 333
The overall pattern in terms of the contribution of each energy carrier is similar between the 334 full sample and the two subsamples ( Figure A2 and Figure A3 In order to assess the robustness of our results with regard to how we select the countries 403 included in our sample, we perform three sensitivity checks. 12 404
Application to Emission Scenarios
First, we repeat our estimates excluding the Former Soviet Union and Former Yugoslavia 405 (for years prior to 1990) and its constituent entities (1990 and after) from the overall sample. 406
The results are very similar to those reported above. Therefore we can conclude that the 407 economies in transition do not bias our results for the overall sample. 408
Second, we include all countries for which data are available, even if zeroes are reported in 409 every single year for a given energy carrier or economic sector. For this enlarged sample of 410 128 countries, the overall Gini displays a less pronounced decline, from slightly below 0.6 in 411 1971 to slightly above 0.5 in 2008. This is quite intuitive, as countries reporting zero 412 emissions can be expected to have an upward influence on overall inequality. With regard to 413 primary energy carrier, the general patterns are repeated. Yet, with the larger sample, the 414 decline in the contribution of oil is less pronounced (from 0.21 in 1971 to 0.18 in 2008) and 415 the increase in the contribution of natural gas stronger (from 0.14 to 0.25 in 2008). For 416 economic sectors, we again find that the decline in overall emission inequality is almost 417 exclusively explained by the reduced contribution of the manufacturing & construction 418 sector. 419
Third, as observations with a zero value might be considered as a sign of reporting errors, 420
we remove all countries that report zero emissions from any single source of emissions in 421 any year from our sample. This smaller sample, which includes only 46 countries, produces 422 a smaller Gini index for overall emissions (slightly below 0.5 in 1971, and slightly below 0.4 423 in 2008). This can very likely be explained by the fact that countries that report zeroes are 424 predominantly low emitters. Hence, removing these countries from the sample curtails the Yitzhaki, 438 (1985, 1984) to analyze the contribution of individual primary energy carriers and economic 439 sectors on inequality in total per-capita CO 2 emissions across countries. We analyze past 440 trends using historical data on energy-related CO 2 emissions and also provide an outlook on Our results were found to be robust for different country groupings and marginal effects 459 tests. Firstly, repeating the analysis for OECD and non-OECD countries separately revealed 460 that, while the results are quantitatively different, a similar pattern emerges. As observed 461 also for the whole sample, inequality in per-capita emissions decreased for both OECD and 462 non-OECD countries, and this was mainly due to decreasing contributions from emissions 463 from coal/peat and oil from a primary energy carrier perspective, and a decreasing 464 contribution from manufacturing emissions from a sectoral perspective. Evaluating the 465 marginal effect of an equally spread reduction of emissions from any one source of 466 emissions (i.e. primary energy carries, or economic sectors) on the Gini coefficient of total per-capita emissions, we find that any such reduction would only have minor impacts on 468 overall emission inequality. 469
Using scenarios of future emissions generated with the integrated assessment model 470 REMIND, we find that climate policy can be expected to result in a more equal distribution of 471 global emissions across countries. The main driver behind this effect is the share of 472 emissions from coal, which under the BAU case is projected to be the major contributor to 473 emission inequality from 2050 onwards, while in the policy case its effect is completely 474 phased out by the end of the century. Changes attributed to oil use are working in the 475 reverse direction, but their effect in overall emissions inequality is not as influential as 476 changes related to coal use. Additionally, notable progressive reductions in global total fossil 477 fuel emissions indicate the considerable diminution in fossil fuel use across all countries. 478
This factor limits the possibility for significant across-country divergence in the level of fossil 479 fuel emissions, in the context of drastic emissions reductions in order to achieve the 480 stabilization target. 481
Our findings provide a more fine-grained understanding of the underlying drivers of 482 inequality in per-capita CO 2 emissions than previous studies. In particular, they underline the 483 importance of energy system and economic transformations for emissions inequality, by 484 highlighting how changes in the use of primary energy carriers and economic activity 485 between sectors propagates into across-country inequality in per-capita CO 2 emissions. 486
The issue of inequality in per-capita emissions can be expected to occupy a top spot in the 487 agenda of future climate negotiations. Any future climate agreement faces the challenge of 488 achieving a distribution of emission rights that is recognized as equitable by all participants. 489
Our results indicate that reducing emission inequality is compatible with climate stabilization 490 only if high emitters accept more substantial cuts in their per-capita emissions compared to 491 low emitters. A clear understanding of historical trends and patterns, combined with the 492 integrated assessment of policy scenarios, can form the basis to evaluate the implications of 493 future climate policies. This is where this paper intends to make a contribution. 494 495 496 8 Appendix 570 
